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Abstract 
This paper examines supply chain health and safety initiatives in the oil shipping industry. In 
particular, it explores the triangular relationships between ship cargo clients, shipping company 
management, and seafarers, and reveals the inherent complexities and tensions involved. It 
shows while managers capitalise on the supply chain pressure to squeeze more effort out of 
seafarers, seafarers tend to adhere to the corporate line colluding with managers to hide defects 
and falsify records. Nevertheless, seafarers occasionally use the supply chain leverage to their 
advantage by tactically exposing ship defects during ship inspections. 
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While the management-employee dyad has been the traditional focus of sociology of work, 
increasingly it is pointed out that this dyadic relationship can no longer capture the full 
spectrum of working experience due to the changing world of work (Korczynski 2013; Wright 
and Kaine 2015). First, the rise of service work brings to the fore the role of the customer within 
the social relations involved in this type of work (Korczynski 2013). Second, as supply chains 
and global production networks have become indispensable in the global economy, the 
relationship between suppliers and their business clients is recognised to be an important factor 
that affects employment practices (Wright and Kaine 2015). Consequently, two types of 
customers, one being individual customers of service work and the other business clients in 
supply chains, have generated two bodies of literature that go beyond the management-
employee dyad.  
 
This paper examines the practices of supply chains in the oil shipping industry by drawing on 
the insights from the literature on customer orientated service work. It not only recognises the 
worker-customer dyad as an additional dimension in work relations but also pays attention to 
the role played by customers in monitoring the performance of workers (Fuller and Smith 1991; 
Gamble 2007; Korczynski et al. 2000). Fuller and Smith (1991) argued that service companies 
increasingly solicited, collected, and utilised customer feedback to monitor the labour process 
and manage employees. Therefore employees are under both managerial control and customer 
control (Bélanger and Edwards 2013; Fuller and Smith 1991). Gamble (2007) pushed the 
argument further by arguing that the presence of the customer, as a third party, constituted an 
essential element in the labour process and brought forth a complex triangle of workers, 
managers and customers. She demonstrated that a range of possible shifting coalitions could 
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be formed between the three parties, which manifested ‘inherent complexities, ambiguities, 
contradictions and shifting balances of power’ within the triangular relations (Gamble 2007: 
21). Thus, research related to customer orientated service work has taken a triangular approach 
which examines the complex power dynamics among the three parties and raise the question 
of how and in what context one party can achieve its objectives by drawing on the power of a 
second to influence the third (Rosenthal 2004). 
 
By contrast, the starting point as well as the core of the extant supply chain literature, is supply 
chain pressure, with the focus on how this pressure is cascaded from client organisations down 
to supplier firms and then down to the workers. This approach is inherently linear and one 
directional. As such, the complex triangular relations, inherent tensions, shifting balances of 
power, and the associated implications for work and employment relations in supply chains 
remain to be fully explored. In this context, this paper adopts a triangular approach examining 
the triangular relations involved in the supply chain of the oil shipping industry. After a review 
of the literature on supply chain pressure and proposing a triangular approach, this paper will 
introduce the background of the research and research methods. Then it will discuss the set of 
relationships involved in the three parties, and draw out the implications in the conclusion.   
 
Supply chain pressure and employment practices 
Supply chains are an essential part of contemporary business activities and involve client firms 
outsourcing/buying materials, products, or services from suppliers. This paper focuses on 
buyer-driven chains in which larger buyers/clients at the top have more bargaining power than 
smaller suppliers. This unequal power distribution produces supply chain pressure, which has 




Research has shown that such pressure can have both positive and negative impacts depending 
on how it is exerted by the lead firms. There are cases where lead firms use their power to 
encourage suppliers to adopt ‘high performance’ human resource management (HRM) 
strategies (Marchington and Vincent 2004; Scarbrough 2000; Wright and Kaine 2015). In the 
UK automotive industry, for instance, a study conducted by Beaumont et al. (1996) showed 
that customers utilised their market power to facilitate positive employee relations changes in 
small supplier firms such as an increase in training and employee management communication. 
Research in the chemical and construction industries (Deakin and Loukiadaki 2009; 
Marchington and Vincent 2004) as well as in the manufacturing sector (Locke et al. 2013; 
Distelhorst et al. 2017) found that client firms enforced a range of regulatory initiatives, such 
as codes of conduct, certification schemes and monitoring programmes, in their supply chains 
in order to improve working conditions, labour standards and occupational health and safety 
(OHS) outcomes.  
 
It has been reported that the lead firms tend to take such initiatives largely to protect its 
reputational risk (Walters and James 2011; Wright and Brown 2013; Wright 2016). Good 
reputation and a positive brand image are critical factors for business organisations especially 
those who are customer-facing global brands. It is in their interest to maintain and promote 
better working conditions and related issues along the supply chain to avoid being associated 
with ‘sweatshops’ or such poor practices. In fact, reputational risk is a frequently used leverage 
by trade unions, non-government organisations, and other civil society groups to put pressure 
on lead firms to improve labour standards in their supply chains (Wright 2016). Nevertheless, 
pressure alone does not necessarily guarantee expected outcomes. For such supply chain 
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initiatives to work, studies have further revealed that effective monitoring and penalty regimes 
need to be in place (Walters et al. 2016; Walters and James 2011).  
 
Despite some positive cases, it remains a big challenge to convert supply chain pressure into 
good employment practices (James et al. 2015) as more often than not such pressure produces 
negative outcomes. As nearly in every business, the main objective of supply chain 
management is to reduce costs, with evidence that lead firms often take advantage of their 
powerful position and transfer costs and risks down to suppliers (Barrientos 2008; 2013; 
Newsome et al. 2013). With their margins being constantly tightened, the relatively smaller 
supplier firms lack in capacity and resources to develop and adopt good HRM strategies and 
find it difficult to recruit and keep quality workers (Carroll et al. 2005). Furthermore, being 
squeezed from above, they also have to find ways to cut costs. The common way to do this is 
by opting for ‘low-road’ HRM strategies (Barrientos 2008; Grimshaw et al. 2005; Hammer and 
Plugor 2016; Lloyd and James 2008; Newsome 2010; Wright and Kaine 2015), such as using 
casual and/or agency workers, adopting flexible working hours, and reducing investment in 
employee development and in improving working conditions. These coping strategies result in 
work intensification, precarious employment, poor working conditions, adverse OHS outcomes, 
and even labour abuse (Barrientos 2013; Lever and Milbourne 2017; Mayhew and Quinlan 
2006). 
 
While it is established that lead firms have power to exert certain control over their supply 
chains, the interesting question in the context of this paper is how supply chain pressure 
influence ‘managerial control and workplace regimes’ (Thompson and Van den Broek 2010) 
in supplier firms. Newsome et al.’s research (2013; see also Newsome 2010) on UK retailer 
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supply chains showed that in order to meet the demands of their clients, suppliers adopted new 
technology to monitor labour performance and speed up work processes. Similarly, Pulignano 
(2002) revealed in her study of supply chains in the Italian automobile industry that the 
management in supplier firms used supply chain pressure as a mechanism to tighten their 
control of their labour process. These research findings resonate with the ‘customer control’ 
thesis advanced by the literature on customer orientated service work (Bélanger and Edwards 
2013; Fuller and Smith 1991; Gamble 2007).  
 
A triangular approach 
The research on customer orientated service work, however, has also advanced a triangular 
approach, arguing that various alignments of interests can exist within the triangle of workers, 
managers and customers (Gamble 2007; Rosenthal 2004). While managers and workers are 
likely to share an interest in influencing customers, in other contexts workers may tacitly use 
the power of customers to influence managers. In call centres, for example, workers may use 
quality of service as an excuse to resist the management’s pressure on conducting a high 
volume of calls (Korczynski et al. 2000). Thus, in this triangular approach, each party actively 
draws on available resources, including the power of other parties, to guard their interests, and 
such activities and struggles bring to light tensions and contradictions inherent at the workplace.  
 
By contrast, although there is a client-supplier management-worker triangle in supply chains, 
there is a tendency in the literature to focus on the concept and consequences of ‘pressure’ 
which is cascaded down from lead clients to supplier firms and then to workers. Such a concept 
implies a linear process and power becomes unidirectional which assumes a linear top-down 
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pressure. A shortcoming associated with this linear approach is that it overlooks workers’ 
agency and tends to regard them as passive bearers of supply chain pressure and managerial 
control (Rosenthal 2004; Carswell and De Neve 2013; Selwyn 2011; 2012). This linear 
approach in supply chain studies is perhaps not surprising, given that supply chain clients are 
different from individual service customers and that they are powerful organisations enjoying 
a dominant position in the triangle. This inherent power imbalance, however, does not 
necessarily mean that workers can only be passive recipients of cascaded pressure.  
 
More recently new debates have brought labour agencies to the foreground in the studies of 
global supply chains (Carswell and De Neve 2013; Coe and Hess 2013; Selwyn 2011; 2012). 
Drawing on Wright’s (2000) distinction between worker’s structural and associational power 
– while structural power is derived from workers’ position in the production process and their 
ability to disrupt it, associational power is related to collective organisations of workers - 
Selwyn (2011; 2012) demonstrates how Brazilian workers in grape farms use both forms of 
power to advance their interests. Of particular relevance to this paper is that Brazilian grape 
producers have to follow health and safety standards imposed by global buyers in order to 
supply to the more lucrative international market. In this context, workers gained structural 
power in the supply chain and their unions utilised the standards to pressurise employers to 
improve working conditions in grape farms (Selwyn 2011). In contrast with the focus on top-
down pressure, it can be said that this body of literature takes a bottom-up approach to explore 
workers’ agency in supply chains.  
 
The top-down focus on labour control (Newsome et al. 2013; Pulignano 2002) combined with 
the bottom-up approach to labour agency (Carswell and De Neve 2013; Coe and Hess 2013; 
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Selwyn 2011; 2012) allude to triangular dynamics. When lead firms take initiatives to improve 
labour standards and working conditions in their supply chains, arguably the outcomes of these 
initiatives would be affected by the triangular power relations and dynamics. In this context, 
this paper proposes and takes a triangular approach to examine supply chain OHS initiatives in 
the oil shipping industry. This approach is neither top-down nor bottom-up but assumes that 
each party has direct links with the other two and pays equal attention to the three pairs in the 
supply chain triangle. This framework is simple, but it will serve to depict a multi-dimensional 
picture of managerial control and the agency of workers in supply chains, and the picture, in 
turn, will shed new light on supply chain initiatives.  
 
The shipping industry and oil majors 
The shipping industry has been transformed into one of the most globalised industry by the 
common practice known as flagging out in which ship owners (who are largely residents in 
OECD countries) register their ships in the so-called flag of convenience (FOC) countries, such 
as Panama and Liberia (ILO 2001). On top of reduced taxation liabilities and lower regulatory 
compliance costs, flagging out allowed ship owners to employ seafarers of any nationality, 
which gave rise to a global seafarer labour market. In order to cut crew costs, unsurprisingly, 
ship managers on behalf of ship-owners crew ships with seafarers from low-cost labour supply 
regions of the globe, such as South East Asia, South Asia, and Eastern Europe. These seafarers 
are commonly recruited through local crew agencies with short-term contracts lasting for 
between six and 12 months, and as such precarious agency employment is the hallmark of the 




Due to its globalised nature, the shipping industry is governed by an elaborately structured 
national and international regulatory regime. International conventions regulating maritime 
safety and environment and labour standards are formulated and adopted at global forums such 
as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) through multilateral deliberations involving individual states and industry stakeholders. 
These conventions are then ratified by flags states and enforced by both flag states (the country 
where the ship is registered) and regional Port State Control (PSC) (the coastal countries where 
the ship calls). State enforcement mechanisms, however, have weaknesses. Many flag states 
have neither the resources nor the will (because they compete with each other for tonnage) to 
enforce regulations strictly. Port states also suffer from resource limitations and can only target 
a small proportion of visiting ships for inspection, and furthermore, the standards of PSC across 
the globe are not consistent due to cultural and economic differences (Sampson and Bloor 
2007).   
 
In oil shipping, Oil Majors, a collective name for big oil companies, such as Shell, Texaco and 
Exxon, act as a private regulatory enforcement actor in addition to the State actors. These 
companies dominate the entire oil supply chain from exploration and production of crude oil 
to refining, as well as to distribution of the refined petroleum products and are major charterers/ 
clients of the oil tankers. As there are only a few of them worldwide, they hold significant 
market power over their transportation suppliers. As a response to increasing public awareness 
of marine pollution, oil majors set up the Oil Company International Marine Forum (OCIMF) 
to provide maritime governing bodies with expertise and knowledge in making regulations and 
guidelines for safe tanker operations.  In 1993 OCIMF launched the Ship Inspection Report 
Programme (SIRE), a safety initiative specifically designed to address concerns about sub-
standard shipping in the tanker sector. The programme involves tanker vetting using a uniform 
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inspection protocol by accredited SIRE inspectors. Such vetting is conducted only on a 
voluntary basis and on invitation from ship managers. The purpose of invitation is to get their 
ships approved by Oil Majors, typically for a period of 12 months, so that these ships would be 
fit for carrying oil majors’ cargo with an enhanced hire value. The result of an oil major 
inspection is shared with other commercial organisations involved in oil shipping, such as oil 
tanker charterers, oil terminal operators and oil traders through the SIRE database.  
 
Due to its coordinated nature, SIRE inspection is more rigorous and more thorough than other 
forms of inspection and thus more challenging for ship operators. It has been reported (Howell 
and Bhattacharya 2016) that tanker operators consider oil major inspections more stringent and 
challenging than the state-based inspection systems. As a result, in the tanker sector in practice, 
the efforts and allocation of resources for the passing of the state-based inspections are 
subsumed within the more demanding oil major inspections. In this context, we will not bring 
the State to the forefront of this discussion especially since the core focus of this paper is on 
the triangular relationships.   
 
Research Method 
This research used two case studies involving tanker operating companies with the oil majors 
as their regular clients. Both companies were located in Europe and each operated between 10 
and 15 tankers. While one ran relatively larger tankers on worldwide oil trade, the other 
specialised in transporting petroleum products within Europe. Both companies enjoyed good 
reputations and had been engaged in the oil transportation business for several years. Their 
shore-based management office employed around 30 personnel of whom around 10 were 
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involved with ship operations and in liaising with Oil Majors. Around five days were spent in 
each office collecting data from the company managers using semi-structured interviews. 
 
Subsequent to the onshore fieldwork, research voyages were undertaken with two tankers of 
each organisation. The first two voyages were on ships of the first company sailing in the 
Persian Gulf and North America while the two remaining voyages on the ships of the second 
company were undertaken in the European waters. Nearly 50 days were spent on these four 
ships during which period a total of 67 seafarers were interviewed and non-participant 
observation was conducted. On each ship, there were four senior officers, the captain, the chief 
officer, who was the captain’s deputy and in charge of the cargo and the ship’s stability, the 
chief engineer, who was in charge of the ship’s machinery and, the second engineer, who was 
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the machineries. The rest were junior officers who 
were largely in charge of keeping watches and ratings who worked in supporting roles.  
 
The seafarers on board the four ships were of different nationalities. On the two ships of the 
first company, while senior officers were from Eastern European countries, the rest of the crew 
were from the Far East. All of them were in temporary employment. On the two ships of the 
second company, senior officers were from West European countries who were employed 
permanently, but junior officers and ratings were from Eastern European countries and the Far 
East who were employed on short-term contracts.  The interviews were digitally recorded and 
later transcribed. These along with the observations, which were noted in a diary, were all 
systematically coded and analysed. 
 
Cascading down oil majors’ pressure 
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From the perspective of tanker shipping companies, passing oil majors’ inspection was ‘the 
unwritten motto’ as failing to do so, could lead to long-term commercial damage. Largely due 
to the data sharing arrangement of SIRE even if the shipping company did not directly conduct 
business with the oil major conducting the inspection, the outcome of such inspection would 
be accessible to all organisations signing up to SIRE. As one ship manager explained: 
They [Oil majors] are omnipresent. Even when we are not chartered by them we may go 
to their terminals or get sub-chartered to them or they could be the sellers or the receivers 
of the cargo. Everyone asks for [oil majors’] vetting report. They have their tentacles 
everywhere which makes it impossible to avoid them. 
 
Such extensive involvement of Oil Majors in vetting is believed to have helped the tanker sector 
achieve a better safety record than other sectors in shipping (Lloyds List, 2005; 2007). The 
managers in this study agreed and felt that although oil majors’ safety initiatives were highly 
onerous they were at the same time beneficial. They were unanimous in agreeing that every 
measure taken for the purpose of passing SIRE inspections resulted in making their tankers 
safer. As one manager put it:  
You would find a striking difference in the level of professionalism in our tanker 
officers when you compare them with those on the bulkies [ships trading solid cargo in 
bulk]. It is not a criticism of our bulk carrier staff, but we are able to raise the standard 
of the tankers simply because we can use Oil Majors’ directive as the driving force.  
 
While ‘the driving force’ led the managers to invest more resources, it was also capitalised on 
by managers to push ship staff to work harder. Managers were of the opinion that seafarers 
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needed to be monitored and pressed because they would not make enough effort on their own. 
In this context, oil majors’ inspection gave them a legitimate reason to push. In the interviews 
they were forthright in explaining how they had to push the seafarers to achieve this challenging 
task and as such were not apologetic in their ways of going about. One manager, for instance, 
said:  
I have to push the seafarers to achieve our business. They need the kick in their 
backsides. Unless we [managers] apply this level of pressure we would never be able 
to realise the level of safety that we have managed on our fleet.  
 
Apart from providing a legitimate reason, oil majors’ inspection also gives guidelines to 
monitor and press for work on ships, as the SIRE inspection protocol lays down detailed and 
operational standards against which ship staff need to manage and maintain their ships. The 
managers used different coercive techniques, such as repeatedly sending harshly worded emails 
and making phone calls, to remind ship staff of their duties and urge them to work. One of the 
senior engineers articulated such communication in his interview: 
The company [managers] keeps sending us threatening emails – they just get very active 
all on a sudden and send us lot of reminders – our own defect lists are sent back to us, 
typical concerns identified in oil majors’ inspection generally and also a long list of 
defects that were reported by inspectors in other ships of our company… The bottom 
line is to convey “do what you have to, but pass the inspection”. 
 
On top of sending reminders, the managers also visited ships when they felt it was necessary. 
Ship visits bridged the distance between shore and ships, and allowed managers to directly 
monitor their offshore colleagues. One manager, for instance, mentioned: 
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As soon as we fix an inspection we inform the ship. Then we remind them of all the 
defects and hot spots. We have to guide them and tell them exactly what to do. Sometimes 
we also need to visit the ship to convey the seriousness. In fact I’ve just returned from a 
ship in the States. 
 
Seafarers construed these reminders and visits as pressures applied by the managers to pass 
inspection. A chief officer called these inspections as ‘pressures from the managers on top of 
everyday pressures’ that they were subjected to, and a captain summed it up as ‘an additional 
pressure which only the seafarers were required to endure for the benefit of the whole company’. 
Furthermore, seafarers felt that their contribution did not receive adequate recognition and 
support from the managers although they carried out the actual preparation and had the ultimate 
responsibility to negotiate the inspection. In their view, they were ‘ordered around’ by 
managers which downplayed their professional ability and undermined their pride and dignity.  
 
Despite the complaint, seafarers did their best to cope with the pressure. In the interviews all 
of them expressed a strong sense of fear of being blamed for poor inspection results. Being 
blamed would undermine not only their reputations but also promotional prospects and even 
future job opportunities which were in the hands of managers (for details see Bhattacharya, 
2012a). Even though the senior seafarers from Western European countries in one company 
were permanent employees, they too worried of being made redundant and replaced by 
colleagues earning lower salaries from Eastern European countries. As they shouldered more 
responsibilities on ships, senior officers in particular appeared more wary of the results as they 
felt that they would be apportioned blame in the event of poor outcomes. One of the captains, 
for example, said: 
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You have no idea what happens when the oil majors report too many observations. Up to 
five is okay but anymore or even a single major observation then they [managers] will 
send e-mails like ‘despite our repeated instruction you are still not doing these, can you 
please explain why you are not doing things properly?’ We are genuinely scared how 
they [managers] might react to a failed inspection. They could even sack me. 
 
Even though it might be an unintended consequence, Oil Majors provide a reason as well as 
means for managers to harshly control the labour process on ships, and their initiative helps 
managers justify work intensification. This finding is in line with previous research focussing 
on labour control (Newsome et al. 2013; Pulignano 2002), which however is just one part of 
the story. To have a multi-dimensional picture of this supply chain initiative, it is important to 
examine the other two pairs of relationships in the triangle. 
 
Collusion between managers and seafarers 
Although seafarers complained about the additional pressure, they, especially those serving in 
the senior ranks, were also of the view that passing oil major inspection was a mark of their 
professionalism. They shared with managers the opinion that SIRE inspections contributed 
immensely to the safety of oil tankers. Some of them took for granted that it was their job to 
ensure that their ship was safe and trading profitably. In their views, passing oil majors’ 
inspection was such an example. One Chief Engineer commented:  
I would not like to be asked by the superintendent about why I need certain spare part 
or why there are so many deficiencies in the oil major inspections… I believe it is my 
job to ensure that my owner gets good value for money. 
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It seemed that Oil Majors not only enabled managers to justify their coercive pressure, but also 
helped with ‘manufacturing consent’ over work intensification (Burawoy 1979).  
 
However, passing tanker vetting was seldom straightforward. In the interviews, every senior 
and junior officer was honest in admitting falsifying ship’s logbooks and documents to claim 
that their ship was maintained consistently and that proper actions were taken in the right order 
and at the right time. The following comment made by one junior officer revealed this issue: 
Before arriving at this port the captain, the chief officer and I each spent around an extra 
six hours every day for a whole week filling in and signing forms, checking and cross 
checking them – all because we were expecting an oil major inspection... we were 
clearing paperwork backlogs basically. 
 
This comment also revealed the issue of fatigue caused by long working hours which was 
commonly expressed on all four ships. To maintain ships to the standards required by Oil 
Majors entailed demanding physical work as well as paperwork. Some officers complained 
that in the week prior to an expected inspection, they had to work up to 20 hours a day. Because 
fatigue was a major risk factor affecting safety (Smith 2007), SIRE inspections indeed paid 
attention to seafarers’ recorded working hours to ensure they were sufficiently rested. However, 
seafarers admitted freely that such records ironically were routinely falsified for the purpose of 
passing the inspections.  
 
In their interviews the managers too were forthright in admitting their awareness and support 
of such ‘adjustments’ and in fact indicated how they too were engaged in counter-signing and 
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filling in forms and log books retrospectively in preparation for oil majors’ inspections. Such 
activities of course were maintained off the record and carried out typically through phone 
conversations and when managers visited the ships in preparation for upcoming inspections. 
One of the company managers pointed out: 
We need to look at the paperwork as soon as we go on the ship. Most times I sit with 
the Chief Engineer and the Captain to ensure that the paperwork is up-to-date. Certain 
things [forms and documents] such as those requiring my signature as the DPA 
(Designated Person Ashore), or responses to defect reports, or updated experience 
matrix as per the TMSA (Tanker Management Self-Assessment), or updated feedback 
on internal audit non-compliance reports I fill in [prior to the inspections] as I am 
always on the ship which is to be vetted. 
 
Cheating on inspections surely is not uncommon. Baglioni (2015) in her research of Senegalese 
export horticulture for example noted that exporters often cheated on compliance with EU 
standards by mixing produce from uncertified farms with those from certified ones.  
In the case of this research, however, falsifying records does not necessarily serve seafarers’ 
interests, especially the records of working hours. If oil major inspectors noted that seafarers 
did not have sufficient resting hours, they would request managers to solve the issue which 
would require the managers to provide extra manpower on the ship and thus reduce work 
intensification. However, it is not difficult to understand why seafarers falsified record that was 
designed to protect their own interests. Given their fear of being blamed as mentioned earlier, 
seafarers did not have many options but to do it in line with managers’ expectation. Passing 
inspections thus depended not only on driving seafarers to work harder, but also on collusion 
between the seafarers and managers.  
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Nevertheless, seafarers were not always passive pressure bearers who had to collude with 
managers, and there were occasions in which they leveraged supply chain pressure to their 
advantages, to which we turn next. 
 
Countering manager prerogative  
On all of the research voyages it was of interest to note a counter perspective. In the interviews 
some of the seafarers of junior ranks such as junior officers, bosun and pump man shared an 
interesting narrative about how on certain occasions they had a very different experience with 
oil major inspectors. They reported that sometimes they chose to divulge some of their ships 
defects to inspectors.  
 
This practice, however, should not be misconstrued as a rebellious attitude of the individual 
seafarers who did not toe the corporate line. It is critical that the context in which such decisions 
were taken is well understood. These seafarers who reported adopting such a technique were 
junior yet key members of staff. The common narrative that they shared was to do with 
reporting of equipment that were inoperative due to lack of spare parts. These equipment were 
critical to safety or pollution matters. Also, from the interviews it was clear that reporting of 
such defects to the inspector was not done with any malicious intention, i.e. the seafarers were 
not reporting to hurt the commercial interest of the company or for any personal gain, as one 
bosun put it:  
I don’t report something to get compensation or some personal benefit; this is good for 
the ship and if I report the job will be done and the ship will become safer. The last time 
I showed the inspector how one UTI tape (for measuring liquid level in the cargo tanks) 
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was not that working effectively – all it needed was a new probe. One time I showed 
how the light in the paint locker was not gas tight. 
 
As a consequence of placing these defects on oil majors’ non-compliance/observation list, 
seafarers reported that managers responded promptly and that the equipment was repaired or 
the required spare parts were dispatched to the ship with no further delays. Such prompt 
response gave them some degree of encouragement. They felt that they had been successful in 
persuading the management to make a serious response to their concerns albeit in an indirect 
way. 
 
It was also evident from the interview that when these seafarers took such a step, they did so 
only after they had made a report to the management first, but felt that the managers ‘did not 
respond to the defect report and delayed on purpose.’ The seafarers most commonly referred 
to ‘delay on managers’ part in sending spare parts’ as the reason for them to take this unusual 
bold step as a mechanism to vent their frustration but with positive intent of making their 
workplace safer. Such views were captured in several interviews as the one below from a junior 
engineer: 
The manager will always say get it done, get that done and make things safe, but we 
can’t make spare parts. Sometimes the managers delay because it costs a lot of money. 
They say yes, we will get it done but they never get the spare parts – sometimes months 
go by. Then comes oil major inspection. We try to hide but sometimes it is not possible 
to hide and it is also not safe to hide. Then I report. One time I showed how the 
incinerator cut off switch was not of correct specification. Maybe it was expensive but 
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without it the whole ship is unsafe. So I pointed it out to the Shell inspector. It was put 
in the defect list and the spare came in the next port. 
 
A pump man [a rating with specialised role on tankers] on one of the ships was forthright in 
divulging in the interview how he took advantage of oil major inspections. He pointed out that 
managers were not always true to their words about doing everything to ensure a safe ship and 
was critical of the way in which the managers pushed them to pass inspections but were not 
prepared to offer the corresponding level of support to the ships. The pump man gave an 
example of a leaking pump in the pump room and explain how it flooded the bilge in the pump 
room which compromised the ship’s safety and increased their workload. He continued to 
explain why and how he decided to use oil majors’ inspection to get the problem addressed. 
He said: 
This is third time for me on this ship. I know this ship very well. I reported this problem 
to the chief mate long time back. But when I came back this time the same problem was 
still there and now you see it is still the same. You run the pump it leaks. You need to 
change the gasket at the sea-chest (main inlet from the sea). This requires shore help 
and some extra fitters. But the managers want to go on like this till the dry dock. It is 
no good like this. So, last month I showed it to the BP inspector. I told him, this one 
leaking. It came on the report and now we are getting some help in the next port to get 
it done in ballast (light) condition. 
 
Even four out of the total of 16 senior officers on the four ships also disclosed in the interviews 
how they have in their career at least once covertly divulged shipboard safety related concerns 
to the inspectors. They too shared similar views while justifying the reasons for disclosing such 
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secrets to the inspectors and pointed to the managers’ deliberate and purposeful denial of 
addressing serious safety concerns on board ships. The following interview of a captain 
exemplified this point. He said: 
I have leaked information to oil major inspectors many times. Look, I’m not a traitor 
and did that only when the office [managers] did not care about what I said to them. 
They rarely listen to us and do not see our problems. So unless someone else tells them 
they don’t do [anything]. It puts us [the ship] in trouble. But if it is noted in the Oil 
Majors’ report, spares and technicians [to repair the defect] await us in the next port. 
 
From the quotations above, it is clear that managers wanted to save money, tacitly expecting 
seafarers to make do with inadequate resources and hide defects from inspectors. On some 
occasions, seafarers acted in line with such expectations which served to defeat the purpose of 
oil major inspections, while on others, some of them chose to deliberately disclose problems 
to inspectors.  
 
Disclosing of problems and having them sorted out indicate a form of structural power (Wright 
2000; see also Selwyn 2011; 2012) that seafarers gained from the triangular relationships. By 
effectively directing the supply chain pressure on to managers, seafarers were able to safeguard 
their interest of improving workplace safety. Nevertheless, they employed this power covertly 
and only as a last resort as their ability to leverage supply chain pressure was constrained by 
managers’ coercive power. They were concerned if their exploitation of this power led to 




In his study of Brazilian grape farms, Selwyn (2011) observed that workers’ unions utilised 
supply chain leverage to pressurise farm employers to comply with customer stipulated 
standards and improve workplace health and safety. As such, farm workers transformed their 
structural power into strong associational power. In the shipping industry, while the 
International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), a global maritime union association, has 
developed effective bargaining strategies with ship managers to raise labour standards globally, 
the isolation and mobility of ships nevertheless act as barriers for union organisations to support 
seafarers at the workplace level (Kahveci and Nichols 2006; Lillie 2006). In the interviews, 
while seafarers stated to be aware of the ITF, they did not see any relevance of unions on board 
their ships (see Bhattacharya, 2012b). Unable to consolidate their structural power into 
associational power, understandably, seafarers could only take chances to leverage the supply 
chain pressure individually and sporadically in the shadow of managers’ coercive power. 
 
Concluding discussion 
Drawing on the insights from the research on customer orientated service work (Bélanger and 
Edwards 2013; Fuller and Smith 1991; Gamble 2007), this paper examined the client-supplier 
management-worker triangular relations and power dynamics related to OHS supply chain 
initiatives in the tanker shipping industry.  The findings suggest that while the SIRE inspection 
mechanism contributes significantly to tanker safety, it also puts a huge amount of pressure on 
shipping companies. However, being in a relative powerful position, managers largely passed 
the pressure on to seafarers. Capitalising on the demanding requirements of Oil Majors, 
managers felt legitimate to increase monitoring of labour process on ships and to squeeze more 
effort out of seafarers. The reactions of seafarers were ambivalence: some believed it was their 
job to bear with the pressure, whereas the majority of them complained about it. Despite the 
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large amount of resentment, seafarers often chose to collude with managers falsifying 
paperwork, such as working hour records, and hiding equipment and machinery defects during 
inspections. Occasionally, however, seafarers strategically and covertly utilised the leverage of 
oil majors’ pressure against managers, forcing them to make necessary investments in 
workplace safety. Briefly they deployed their structural power to defend their interests, albeit 
with great caution.   
 
This paper is also built upon two different strands of previous research, one on labour control 
(Newsome 2010; Newsome et al. 2013; Pulignano 2002) and the other on labour agency 
(Carswell and De Neve 2013; Coe and Hess 2013; Selwyn 2011; 2012), in supply chains. By 
taking a triangular approach, it presents a multi-dimensional picture to complement the two 
strands of research, revealing that supply chain pressure can serve to reinforce labour control 
while simultaneously enhancing workers’ structural power. Nevertheless, in the context of this 
research, seafarers could not transform structural power into associational power, as the 
Brazilian grape farm workers did in Selwyn’s research (2011; 2012). As such, their capability 
to exercise this form of power was rather limited – constrained by managers’ coercive power, 
they could only exploit it covertly and sporadically. In this context and in addition to the two 
strands of previous literature, the triangular approach serves to bring a third dimension of power 
dynamics involved in supply chains to the surface, that is, more often than not, seafarers 
colluded with managers instead.  
 
Thus, seafarers alternated between colluding with managers which was the norm and making 
use of supply chain leverage which was more of an exception. Instead of being contradictory, 
this practice reflects that seafarers had different interests with various priorities. While both 
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securing promotion/employment and having a safe workplace serve their interests, the former 
appeared to have a higher priority. As such, they acted in line with management expectations, 
with either consent or resentment, to undermine oil majors’ safety initiatives most of the time. 
Only on occasions when they were discontented with managers’ irresponsibility, did they 
exploit their structural power cautiously to defend their interests of having a safe workplace. 
In other words, they exercised their agency by strategically adjusting their action to deal with 
the pressure and to best safeguard their interests.   
 
This paper also makes a contribution in another front. As the triangular approach helps capture 
the complexity of power dynamics in supply chains, it provides a context in which the impacts 
of supply chain initiatives can be evaluated in a more nuanced way.  Previous research showed 
how the approach adopted by the lead firms, which apply market pressure, determine 
improvement or deterioration of labour standards and working conditions down the chain 
(Newsome et al. 2013; Wright and Kaine 2015). Among them some have criticised this 
approach as it undermined worker participation from the perspective of the industrial relations 
(see Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013) whereas some have also revealed that effective monitoring 
and penalty regimes help (positive) supply chain initiatives improve OHS outcomes (Walters 
et al. 2016; Walters and James 2011). While these findings provide valuable insight, they 
overlooked workers’ responses. This paper adds to this body of literature by showing that 
workers’ ability to exercise their structural power can make a difference. In Selwyn’s research 
(2011) workers transformed structural power into associational power which served to improve 
OHS standards at workplace. In this research, by contrast, seafarers could not exploit their 
structural power collectively and effectively but chose to collude with managers which 




It is worthwhile pointing out that seafarers are not a homogeneous group and they occupy 
different ranks in a strict hierarchy of shipboard social structure which often generate tensions 
and conflicts. However, the focus of this paper is on OHS and a safe workplace with adequate 
resources and manpower which is in the interest of all seafarers. Even though senior officers 
perform the function of shipboard management, they are different from shore-based 
management in that their priority is on their personal safety rather than corporate profit. In this 
respect, senior officer, junior officers and ratings are literally and metaphorically on the same 
boat. Therefore, this paper treats seafarers as one party in the triangle. Given tensions and 
conflicts are likely to exist on shipboard workplace itself, it would be interesting to further 
investigate how supply chain initiatives might affect these, but this is beyond the scope of this 
paper.   
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